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Note
Moving Beyond Reflexive Chevron Deference: A Way
Forward for Asylum Seekers Basing Claims on
Membership in a Particular Social Group
Seiko Shastri*
INTRODUCTION
Many vulnerable groups fall through the cracks of the United
States’ asylum system, unable to find relief within the labyrinthine yet
insufficient protections it offers.1 One particular category of endangered individuals consists of women and girls who are being persecuted based on their gender.2 Gender-based persecution includes domestic violence, rape by criminal gangs, and honor killings, among
other gender-related violence.3 Applicants for asylum in the United
States must show they have a “well-founded”4 fear of persecution, as
well as show that this persecution is based on one of five specific reasons—their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in what is called a “particular social group” (PSG).5 Gender on its
own is not among these textually enumerated grounds of protection,
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. Many thanks to Ben
Casper Sanchez for advising and mentoring me throughout and beyond the Note-writing process. Special thanks to Chizuko, Akira, and Ananda Shastri for their love and
encouragement. Thanks also to Anna Berglund for the same. Copyright © 2021 by
Seiko Shastri.
1. Since the enactment of the Migrant Protection Protocols (“Remain in Mexico”
policy) by President Trump, 0.1% of applicants at the southern U.S. border have been
granted asylum. Gustavo Solis, Remain in Mexico Has a 0.1 Percent Asylum Grant Rate,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/
news/border-baja-california/story/2019-12-15/remain-in-mexico-has-a-0-01
-percent-asylum-grant-rate [https://perma.cc/22FT-YEZB].
2. Stephen Legomsky, Gender-Related Violence Should Be Grounds for Asylum.
Congress Must Fix This for Women., USA TODAY (Jan. 2, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www
.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/01/02/gender-related-violence-grounds
-asylum-refugee-women-congress-column/2415093002 [https://perma.cc/QR9G
-NTZ9].
3. Id.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
5. Id.
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and so women and girls fleeing from situations of gender-based persecution generally have sought to prove they are members of a PSG.6
Yet, individuals attempting to submit this kind of asylum claim have
faced ever-mounting roadblocks erected by the Department of Justice’s Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative
forum that determines asylum claims, and decisions and regulations
published by the Attorney General.7 One of the most challenging requirements that women and girls fleeing gender-based persecution
now face in the U.S. asylum process is proving “social distinction” of
their claimed PSGs.8 This requirement means that, in order to even be
considered for eligibility in the asylum process, she must prove that
the society in her home country perceives the class of individuals she
is a part of as a sufficiently distinct “group.”9
The construction of barriers to asylum eligibility have been made
possible because of the great degree of deference that administrative
agencies like the BIA enjoy.10 Over the past thirty-six years, courts
have developed a doctrine of judicial deference in administrative law
that often gives administrative agencies vast leeway when changing
their policies. The Supreme Court’s landmark 1984 administrative law
ruling, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,11
and its progeny, generally require courts to defer to any reasonable
agency interpretations of statutes within their regulatory purview
that are ambiguous to the extent that Congress has left a particular
interpretive question open as a gap for the agency to fill.12
6. See, e.g., A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (recognizing “married women in Guatemala who are
unable to leave their relationship” as a particular social group).
7. See infra Part I.F.
8. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (B.I.A. 2014); M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
227 (B.I.A. 2014).
9. See, e.g., S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding the proposed PSG of “immediate family members of [Honduran] women who cannot leave domestic relationships” lacked social distinction); Alvizuriz-Lorenzo v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 791 F. App’x 70, 76 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding the proposed PSGs of “girls or
young women in Guatemala who cannot leave their family as a result of their age or
economic conditions” and “girls or young women in Guatemala who cannot leave their
family” are not socially distinct); Rivera-Geronimo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 783 F. App’x 941,
946 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding the proposed PSG of “Guatemalan women in domestic
relationships” is not socially distinct); Osorto-Romero v. Sessions, 732 F. App’x 62, 63–
64 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding the proposed PSG of “Honduran women who are viewed as
gang property by virtue of their gender” failed to satisfy the social distinction requirement).
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. Id. at 842–44.
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The Chevron deference doctrine has had a profound impact on
immigration law. One of the most significant areas of this impact has
been the application of the Chevron test to determine what constitutes
a PSG under the federal statute that grants asylum to persecuted refugees.13 In order to be eligible for asylum, an applicant “must establish
that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
for persecuting the applicant.”14 Of these various grounds for asylum,
the question of what constitutes a PSG within the meaning of the statute has been a hotbed of litigation since the law was enacted.15 For
more than two decades, PSGs were defined using the standalone immutable characteristic standard set forth in Matter of Acosta.16 The
BIA added two additional requirements of “particularity” and “social
visibility” in the mid-2000s and then sought to clarify the new standard in 2014.17 Under this new three-part standard, an applicant “must
establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
(3) socially distinct18 within the society in question.”19
Courts have struggled with the application of the changing definitions the BIA has used but have found it especially challenging in
recent years to apply the elements of particularity and what is now
called “social distinction.”20 This has led to a split among the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals, as different circuits have decided to
apply varying levels of Chevron deference to the BIA’s decisions.21 In
practice, this has had the result of sowing confusion about the standard and making it incredibly difficult for asylum applicants—particularly those who are pro se—who have credible claims but do not fall

13. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
14. Id.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
17. See Kenneth Ludlum, Note, Defining Membership in a Particular Social Group:
The Search for a Uniform Approach to Adjudicating Asylum Applications in the United
States, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115, 119–22 (2015).
18. Id. (explaining that the 2014 attempt to clarify the new PSG standard included
articulating what it had previously referred to as social “visibility” as social “distinction” instead).
19. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (B.I.A. 2014); M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
227 (B.I.A. 2014).
20. Ariel Lieberman, What Is a “Particular Social Group”?: Henriquez-Rivas Provides a Possible Solution to Circuit Courts’ Confusion, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 455, 461
(2014).
21. See infra Part II.B.
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into one of the other protected grounds from successfully fighting for
their claims.22
As the circuit courts of appeals continue to struggle with defining
PSGs, the Supreme Court has thus far declined to weigh in on the issue.23 At the same time, however, Justices on the Court have increasingly shown a willingness to question Chevron and other types of judicial deference to agency decision-making as a general matter.24 This
shift by the Supreme Court—particularly in light of Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions25 and the interrelated analysis of judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations in Kisor v.
Wilkie26—suggests that the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split on this issue. These developments also suggest
that the lower circuit courts may now have cause to revisit whether
their past decisions, to the extent they extended deference to the BIA’s
current PSG standard, did so too reflexively and assess the standard
with greater judicial rigor. A reexamination of circuit court decisions
on the BIA’s post-Acosta additions, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, arguably reveals that most of the courts of appeals
were too quick to conclude Chevron deference applied to the updated
PSG standard. Overturning circuit court precedents applying this reflexive deference to the new PSG standard is a critical step to aligning
U.S. asylum adjudication with the original purpose of asylum law as
intended by Congress.
Part I of this Note will examine the history of U.S. asylum law, the
role of Chevron deference within the immigration realm, and the current state of asylum law in the United States. Part II of this Note will
discuss in-depth the evolution of the PSG definition and the ensuing
circuit split and critically examine the role of Chevron deference in
those decisions. It will also conclude that the Seventh Circuit (which
did not defer to the BIA under Chevron) was correct in its analysis, attributable to the more rigorous and independent judicial analysis of
congressional intent it applied in its calibration of Chevron review.
Part III of this Note analyzes the applicability of the reasoning in Kisor
22. See generally Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355, 367–79 (2015) (reviewing the judicial treatment of the
standard set in Acosta in the years following the decision).
23. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, Reyes v.
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (illustrating a case where the Supreme Court declined
to address how lower courts should define PSGs).
24. See infra Part I.E.
25. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018).
26. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
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v. Wilkie and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions to
argue that the Supreme Court is moving away from what it has called
“reflexive deference” to agency interpretations, and that this indicates
that the circuit courts that deferred to the BIA’s addition of requirements to the Acosta definition did so too reflexively. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should intervene to clarify that most of
the circuit courts have not engaged in proper Chevron analysis of the
PSG standard and undertake an appropriately rigorous application of
all the traditional tools of statutory interpretation itself to answer the
interpretive question. This Note argues that were the Supreme Court
to do so, it should favor the Seventh Circuit’s current case law. Finally,
this Note concludes that in the absence of direct Supreme Court intervention, circuit courts that previously deferred to the BIA’s current
PSG standard now have cause to revisit those prior rulings and should
assess whether they deferred too reflexively. Resolution of the PSG
standard is vital, as continuing uncertainty of its parameters is a matter of life or death for the thousands of individuals fleeing persecution
and seeking asylum in the United States based on their membership
in a particular social group.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF “PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” IN UNITED
STATES ASYLUM LAW
In order to understand the problems with the current manifestation of the particular social group standard, it is helpful to explore the
broader context of the history of U.S. asylum law and the current procedure of asylum adjudication. This Part begins with this context before examining the development of the protected ground of membership in a PSG as a basis for asylum applications.27 This Part then
explores Chevron deference, an administrative law doctrine that has
been extremely influential in shaping immigration law and the PSG
standard, paying particular attention to concerns about the doctrine
expressed by Supreme Court Justices.28 Finally, this Part concludes by
examining Kisor v. Wilkie and its potential for bringing a transformation to the PSG standard through a more rigorous analysis of Chevron deference—a transformation made all the more urgent by recent
changes to asylum policy.29

27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra Part I.D.
29. See infra Parts I.E–F.
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A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
In order to be granted asylum in the United States, an applicant
must meet the statutory definition of a “refugee”:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.30

Congress adopted this definition as part of the Refugee Act of
1980,31 which enacted the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol.32 The 1951 Convention
outlined the definition of refugees in modern international law and set
forth “the kind of legal protection, other assistance, and social rights”
that governments ought to provide to refugees.33 The 1967 Protocol
expanded the scope of the 1951 Convention by eliminating its original
“geographical and time limits.”34 The U.S. definition of “refugee” is the
same as the Convention’s definition basing protection on the five protected grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a PSG, and
political opinion.35 Notably, in codifying its obligation to the international treaty, Congress declared that the Refugee Act of 1980 reflected
“the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs
of persons subject to persecution in their homelands” and promised
to “encourage all nations to provide assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest extent possible.”36 While the
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (outlining the eligibility criteria and procedures for
asylum).
31. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102–03 (1980).
32. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150; I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428–29 (1987).
33. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 32, art. 1(A)(2); UNHCR, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL
1 (2011). The Convention defined a “refugee” as an individual who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 32, art. 1(A)(2).
34. UNHCR, supra note 33, at 4.
35. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102–03 (1980).
36. Id. § 101(a), 94 Stat. at 102. The INA has been subsequently modified numerous times. Significant changes were brought about by the Illegal Immigration Reform
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protective purpose of the different grounds is clear, the drafting histories of the Convention provide little insight into the intended scope
of “particular social group.”37 This has led to confusion and inconsistency in the adjudication of asylum cases.38
Membership in a PSG is not enough to get asylum.39 An applicant
must also satisfy multiple other elements, including that (1) they were
harmed in the past or have a “well-founded fear” of future harm, (2)
the harm is severe enough to rise to “persecution,” (3) the harm was
or will be inflicted by the government or an entity the government is
unwilling or unable to control, and (4) the harm is “on account of” (5)
one or more of the five protected grounds.40 Even when an individual
meets all the elements of the refugee definition, he or she is not guaranteed to be granted that relief. There are numerous other regulatory
and statutory grounds that may disqualify a refugee,41 and otherwise
qualifying individuals may be denied asylum based on the government’s broad discretion.42 The overarching structure of U.S. asylum
law, therefore, serves to work as a set of legal “filters” that limit access
to relief.43 All five of the grounds for asylum protection—including
membership in a PSG—can potentially include large numbers of diverse individuals.44 However, an applicant that proves their
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, including the addition of a requirement that asylum seekers demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence” that they
filed their asylum application within one year of arriving in the United States. Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-689, 3009-690–91 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (1998)).
37. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Third Meeting, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (Nov. 19,
1951); see Ivan A. Tereschenko, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Continuous Search
for the Definition of “Membership in a Particular Social Group” in Matter of M-E-V-Gand Matter of W-G-R-: In the Context of Youth Resistant to Gang Recruitment in Central
America, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 93, 99–100 (2014) (“Neither the 1951 Convention nor the
1967 Protocol have defined ‘membership in a particular social group,’ and the drafting
history fails to specify its exact meaning.”).
38. See, e.g., Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
107, 119–47 (2013) (discussing varying outcomes in the adjudication of particular social group claims based on domestic violence).
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
40. Id. (identifying both objective and subjective elements).
41. Id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A), 1231(b)(3)(B).
42. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(C).
43. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (2014).
44. Benjamin Casper, Katherine Evans, Julia DiBartolomeo Decker & Hayley Steptoe, Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a
Particular Social Group,” 14-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2014).
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membership in a PSG only becomes a candidate for relief, and the
other requirements of the refugee definition limit this larger group to
a much smaller number of individuals who are ultimately able to gain
protection in the United States.45
B. IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW ADJUDICATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Immigration adjudication in the United States primarily occurs
through the thousands of decisions made each year by asylum officers
and immigration judges (IJs), both of whom are located in the executive branch.46 Immigration judges, while located within the federal
government, are not Article III judges.47 Rather, the immigration
courts and the appellate body that reviews IJ decisions, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), are part of the Executive Office
of Immigration Review (EOIR) which is an agency within the Department of Justice.48 Immigration judges and Board members are also not
administrative law judges and therefore do not have the same safeguards to their independence provided by the Administrative Procedures Act.49 Both IJs and Board members are appointed by the Attorney General and may only be removed for cause.50 However, as a
matter of discretion, the Attorney General may reassign them to a different position.51 Importantly, the immigration courts are situated in
a position of supervision underneath the nation’s chief prosecutor—
the EOIR Director reports directly to the Deputy Attorney General.52
While IJs are not directly part of the entity responsible for immigration enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), “they
have long complained that their position under the Attorney General
undermines their independence.”53 A primary concern with the
45. Id.
46. 8 C.F.R. § 100.1 (2018).
47. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1640 (2010).
48. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2018).
49. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643,
1648 (2016); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101,
1145 (2006).
50. Barnett, supra note 49; Resnik, supra note 49.
51. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 373–74 (2006) (explaining how Attorney General Ashcroft reduced
the BIA’s size and “promised the future reassignments” of its members).
52. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b).
53. Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL.
L. REV. 707, 709 (2019) (citing Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration
Court System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigr. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3–5 (2018)). Other factors give rise to concern about the
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current system is the “inherent conflict of interest” IJs face as adjudicators that makes them “particularly vulnerable to political pressure
and interference,” a major issue when they are making life or death
decisions in asylum cases.54
1. Typical Procedure for Applying for Asylum
Asylum seekers have two primary methods for claiming asylum55
in this vast, confusing, and altogether not impartial immigration system. If DHS has initiated removal proceedings, a noncitizen may file
what is often referred to as a “defensive” application for asylum with
the immigration court.56 If DHS has not initiated removal proceedings,
an individual may file an “affirmative” application with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS).57 In either context, the application form itself and the relevant legal standards are generally the
same.58 As a procedural matter, affirmative applications are first reviewed by asylum officers charged to conduct non-adversarial interviews and decide to either grant the application or refer the application to an IJ for further defensive consideration in the context of
removal proceedings.59 Sixty-five percent of affirmative applications
are referred to immigration courts.60 Either the government or the
independence of IJs and Board members. By regulation, IJs and Board members have
a duty to “exercise their independent judgment and discretion” when adjudicating the
individual cases before them. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (2018). Yet, they must also
“act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.” Id.
§ 1003.1(a) (2018); see also Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 491, 493 (2019) (“In a deportation case, the Department of Homeland Security
operates as police, jailer, prosecutor, and deporter, while the Department of Justice
plays the role of judge through its Immigration Courts. Both departments answer to
the same Chief Executive, and can easily work together in pursuit of a more aggressive
immigration policy.”).
54. ABA Again Calls for an Independent Immigration Court, A.B.A. (July 23, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/
publications/washingtonletter/july_2019_washington_letter/immigration_article_
0719 [https://perma.cc/3VBS-6E8X].
55. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtaining
-asylum-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/4RVP-H3LH] (Sept. 22, 2020).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (2018). The IJ may rely on the asylum officer’s findings of fact.
Id. § 1240.7(a). However, the IJ ultimately exercises de novo review of the application.
Id. § 1003.42(d).
60. JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 33 (2009).
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noncitizen may appeal an IJ’s decision to the BIA.61 Final removal orders issued by the Board may be appealed by submitting a petition for
review to the United States Court of Appeals.62 The current backlog of
cases in the immigration courts63 means that most asylum applicants
do not get the merits of their cases adjudicated for years.64
C. MATTER OF ACOSTA: THE BIA’S FIRST MAJOR GUIDANCE ON WHAT
CONSTITUTES A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
In addition to the broader uncertainty asylum seekers face because of the infirmities and inefficiencies of the structure of asylum
adjudication, they also face uncertainty in how the merits of their
cases are evaluated if they base their claim on membership in a PSG.
The definition of “particular social group” did not come from the Refugee Act but rather from the BIA’s interpretation of the term in a precedent-setting case in 1985, Matter of Acosta.65 Using the ejusdem generis canon66 in relation to the four other protected grounds, the BIA
reasoned that membership in a PSG was also defined by an “immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of
an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”67 In the subsequent two decades, multiple BIA cases applied the Acosta standard
for PSGs to approve important social groups that were based only on

61. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2018).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
63. As of August 2020, there were more than 1.2 million immigration cases pending in immigration courts nationwide. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, SYRACUSE U.
TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog [https://
perma.cc/F98N-YA4M].
64. See Lindsay M. Harris, The One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of the Immigration Court Backlog, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1185, 1204–05 (describing how the current backlog is affecting the timing for an applicant’s merit hearing).
65. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987) (“[T]he ‘clear probability’ standard
and the ‘well-founded fear’ standard are not meaningfully different and, in practical
application, converge. That portion of . . . Matter of Acosta has therefore been effectively overruled.”).
66. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“[G]eneral words used in an enumeration with
specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”).
67. Id.
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immutable characteristics such as sexual orientation (Matter of Toboso-Alfonso)68 and gender-related mutilation (Matter of Kasinga).69
After the BIA’s decision in Acosta, the circuit courts of appeals applied Chevron deference70 and followed the immutable characteristics
standard as a permissible interpretation of the ambiguity of “particular social group.”71 The Third Circuit’s decision in Fatin v. I.N.S.72 became a particularly frequently-cited decision, ruling that under Acosta
an applicant must “(1) identify a group that constitutes a ‘particular
social group’ . . . (2) establish that he or she is a member of that group,
and (3) show that he or she would be persecuted or has a wellfounded fear of persecution based on that membership.”73 Critically,
this analysis takes into account that “large and internally diverse social groups—such as women in a given country—should be cognizable
under Acosta without further qualification” because the other definitional requirements of the statute, such as nexus,74 limit the number
of individuals within this broader group who actually qualify for asylum.75
The Acosta definition quickly gained international acceptance,
with other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and New

68. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that homosexuals in Cuba consisted of a particular social group for purposes of asylum).
69. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that “[y]oung women
who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not
been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose
the practice” were a PSG).
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 35–36 (1st Cir. 1993); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2007); Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.
1993); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004); Ontunez-Tursios v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352–53 (5th Cir. 2002); Castellano-Chacon v. I.N.S., 341 F.3d
533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998); Ngengwe v.
Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785,
797 (9th Cir. 2005); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2005); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006).
72. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.
73. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 5.
74. For asylum claims based on membership in a particular social group, the statutory nexus requirement limits asylum to those who can demonstrate that this membership in a PSG was “at least one central reason” for their feared persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). In other words, the nexus requirement means these asylum seekers must prove their persecution occurs “on account of” their membership in a particular social group. See id. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining “refugee” as a person who has a
“well-founded fear of persecution on account of” membership in a PSG).
75. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 5.
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Zealand following the standard set in the United States.76 In 2002,
summarizing the practices of these and other countries, the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued Guidelines
interpreting “particular social group” to include the Acosta definition.77 The Guidelines observed that the first step of analyzing PSGs
should be to assess for immutability, and only if immutability does not
exist should the potential group be analyzed as to whether the society
in question perceives it as a group.78 The proposed definition for a PSG
was as follows:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk
of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.79

Since the UNHCR Guidelines were published, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have declined to apply any kind of requirement of social perception to the identification of PSGs.80 The BIA
however, has significantly changed the definition of PSGs from the
Acosta standard over the past couple of decades.81
D. ASYLUM LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CHEVRON DEFERENCE IN THE
IMMIGRATION LAW CONTEXT
Chevron has become a mainstay of administrative law, and as immigration law is largely administrative, an in-depth understanding of
this doctrine is important.82 The basic rule of Chevron requires a twostep analysis.83 First, it asks whether the intent of Congress is clear on

76. Canada (Att’y Gen.) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 736–39 (Can.); Ex parte Shah
[1999] 2 AC 629 (HL) 640–41 (appeal taken from Immigration Appeal Tribunal)
(Eng.); GJ, Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 27–28 (Refugee Status Appeals Auth. 1995)
(N.Z.), https://www.refworld.org/cases,NZL_RSAA,3ae6b6938.html [https://perma
.cc/Z5BY-JQE5].
77. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International
Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002).
78. Id. ¶ 6–7.
79. Id. ¶ 11.
80. Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication,
45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 391, 434–51 (2013) (discussing the particular social group
standards of other countries).
81. See infra Part II; see also Bednar, supra note 22; Ludlum, supra note 17, at 119–
24 (discussing the history of PSG interpretations since Acosta).
82. Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 32
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 100–04 (2017).
83. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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the specific question at hand.84 Second, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”85 The Supreme Court’s reasoning was based on two
primary principles.86 First, administrative agencies provide necessary
expert knowledge that Congress lacks: “The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”87 Second, Congress has expressly authorized agencies’ ability to create these policies:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.88

In United States v. Mead Corp.,89 the Supreme Court introduced
“Chevron Step Zero,” holding that deference under Chevron is only appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” but did not precisely explain how to identify
when this occurs.90 Several years later, the Supreme Court decided another important addition to the Chevron doctrine, holding in National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services91 that
Chevron trumps stare decisis when statutory meaning is ambiguous.92
In King v. Burwell, the Court applied an additional “extraordinary
questions” or “major questions” limitation to the scope of Chevron deference, whereby an agency’s interpretation of statutory provisions

84. Id.
85. Id. at 843.
86. Jessica Senat, The Asylum Makeover: Chevron Deference, the Self-Referral and
Review Authority, 35 TOURO L. REV. 867, 877 (2019).
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974)).
88. Id. at 843–44.
89. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
90. Id. at 226–27.
91. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
92. Id. at 981–83.
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that have significant economic or political impact do not receive deference.93
While the rule as stated in the Chevron opinion seems fairly
straightforward, it has evolved into a doctrine through subsequent interpretations by lower courts that have expanded its use in review of
administrative law.94 This “process by which Chevron became law—a
series of lower court decisions and then default acceptance in the Supreme Court—prevented . . . ambiguities from being vented and resolved in an authoritative forum; instead, they remain to this day
largely submerged and unaddressed.”95 Some circuit courts have complicated matters even further by requiring agencies to take additional
steps in their interpretations before the court will defer to them96 or
espousing the possibility that an agency may waive Chevron deference.97 With all of the exceptions that have been built in, the Chevron
doctrine no longer provides straightforward guidance to regulated
parties (if it ever really did).98 While the original ruling appeared to be
brightline on its face, in application it has not been as clear.99 However, because Chevron deference has a seemingly clear formulaic character, it makes it more noticeable when a court does not follow it. The
Supreme Court itself “applies Chevron inconsistently at best.”100 What
93. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2015) (holding that matters of
“economic and political significance” are extraordinary cases that give the Court reason to hesitate applying Chevron deference).
94. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law out of Nothing at All: The Origins
of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2013) (discussing the uncertainty
of lower courts dealing with and interpreting Chevron’s unanswered questions).
95. Id. at 6.
96. See Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103, 109 (2019), https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp
-content/uploads/2019/03/Hickman_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GJZ-UDLS] (discussing the varied approaches to Chevron used by courts including the D.C. Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit, and others).
97. See James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 183, 183 (2019), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/
3/2019/01/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Durling-West_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJF7-L2QQ];
Jeremy D. Rozansky, Waiving Chevron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927, 1956 (2018).
98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2602 (2006) (“[Mead] has produced a great deal of confusion and complexity, disappointing those who hoped that Chevron would simplify the
law.”).
99. See Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009) (“[A] canonical text takes on its own metonymic meanings—sometimes quite apart from its literal textual meaning—within the
practice of constitutional law.”).
100. Kagan, supra note 53, at 498; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer,
The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
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has emerged from this inconsistency is a reframing of Chevron by legal
scholars as a more fluid set of guiding principles for jurisprudence instead of a rigid test.101
1. Chevron Deference Within Immigration Law
Within the asylum context, the Supreme Court has been largely
silent on the application of Chevron, with a few notable exceptions.102
In I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the majority opinion by Justice Stevens
gave two reasons for its holding overruling a BIA interpretation of the
INA.103 First, that the language of the statute was sufficiently clear to
decide the issue before the Court104 so “there is simply no need and
thus no justification for a discussion of whether the interpretation is
entitled to deference[.]”105 This reasoning seems like a straightforward application of Chevron Step One, but the opinion went on to say
that Chevron did not apply at all “to a pure question of statutory construction”106 and suggested that the doctrine was more appropriate to
use when an agency applies laws to particular facts.107 Some scholars
have noted that this decision “was an early expression of doubt, from
no less than the author of Chevron itself.”108
While Cardoza-Fonseca did not apply Chevron deference, the
Court did cite and discuss the doctrine indicating that it would apply
Chevron to immigration cases.109 However, in a 1992 case regarding
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1124–25 (2008) (describing statistical findings highlighting the inconsistent application of the Chevron standard); Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead: Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870
(2015) (noting that judges, especially Supreme Court Justices, “have narrowed the circumstances in which Chevron, by its own terms, applies and invoke Chevron only intermittently in those circumstances”).
101. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1766 (2010) (“Chevron and the other formal deference regimes
have the following characteristics in practice: They are flexible rules of thumb or presumptions deployed by the Justices episodically and not entirely predictably, rather
than binding rules that the Justices apply more systematically.”).
102. See Kagan, supra note 53, at 517–21.
103. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423–50 (1987).
104. Id. at 432.
105. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 446.
107. Id. at 448.
108. E.g., Kagan, supra note 53, at 518 (“By the end of the next Term, however, the
Court was again applying the Chevron doctrine (irregularly, as ever) to questions of
law, and Cardoza-Fonseca quietly dropped from sight.” (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 986 (1992))).
109. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445–48; id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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asylum eligibility, the government asked the Court to apply Chevron
deference, but no reference to the doctrine was made in the decision.110 It was not until 1999 in I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, another case
about asylum eligibility, that the Court affirmed that the “principles of
Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.”111 At least
since 1999, the Court seems to have affirmed the application of Chevron deference to immigration cases and deferred more regularly in
cases involving asylum eligibility.112 The Court does, however, appear
to apply Chevron deference very differently in immigration cases concerning deportation.113
2. The State of Chevron Deference Today
Legal scholars now generally agree that the Supreme Court and
the courts of appeals are inconsistent in their application of the Chevron doctrine.114 Notably, Supreme Court Justices themselves have also
begun to openly criticize Chevron and the evolution of its application
to cases decided by the Court.115 For example, in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas directly questioned Chevron’s constitutionality.116 Much
of the criticism of Neil Gorsuch’s nomination to the Supreme Court in
2017 centered around his views117 of Chevron deference.118 During his
110. See generally I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (providing no reference to Chevron or to deference under the doctrine).
111. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (explaining that Congress
explicitly delegated authority to the Attorney General to decide questions of law under
the INA).
112. Kagan, supra note 53, at 518–19 (first citing Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511,
517 (2009); then citing Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 187 (2006); and then citing
I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002)).
113. Discussing the nuanced distinctions that some scholars have noted about the
application of Chevron in cases involving discretionary relief from deportation is beyond the scope of this Note. See Kagan, supra note 53, at 498 (discussing the implicit
ways that the Supreme Court limits Chevron deference when reviewing the legality of
government intrusion upon physical liberty).
114. See, e.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2017); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 100; Herz, supra note 100,
at 1879.
115. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Briquela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the
judicial duty.”).
118. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Gorsuch Nomination Puts Spotlight on Agency Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/business/
dealbook/gorsuch-nomination-puts-spotlight-on-agency-powers.html [https://
perma.cc/KCZ7-UM4A]; Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Agencies Decide Law? Doctrine May Be Tested at Gorsuch Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www
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time as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, “Justice Gorsuch challenged the Chevron doctrine’s premises, contended
that Chevron deference conflicts with separation of powers principles,
and at least strongly hinted that the Supreme Court should repudiate
Chevron.”119
Though they have not been as explicitly critical of the Chevron
doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito also appear to have
doctrinal concerns with judicial deference to agencies. Christopher
Walker has noted that Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with Justice
Scalia in 2013 about how much deference an administrative agency
should get when interpreting the outer boundaries of its own authority.120 In language sounding critical of Chevron, Chief Justice Roberts
expressed concern about the “vast power” of the administrative state
over day-to-day life.121 Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito joined him in
this critique.122
The concerns about Chevron that the Justices have expressed in
questions outside of immigration law indicate that the time may be
approaching for a reckoning about the continued applicability of the
doctrine overall. At the very least, a reckoning in the immigration context seems likely and appropriate considering two recent developments. Pereira v. Sessions was a 2018 Supreme Court case that centered around the BIA’s interpretation of Section 1229(a) of the 1996
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA).123 Justice Kennedy joined the Court’s opinion in full but
wrote a concurrence specifically to discuss his concern with the way
Chevron “has come to be understood and applied.”124 He observed that
when courts of appeals initially began to encounter the question at issue, there was an “emerging consensus” that “abruptly dissolved” after the BIA adopted a different reading of the statute.125 After this
.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/business/dealbook/neil-gorsuch-chevron-deference
.html [https://perma.cc/JG5M-GGF3].
119. Kristin E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70 ALA. L. REV. 733, 735 (2019).
120. Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L.
REV. 1095, 1103 (2016).
121. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (quoting Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
122. Id.
123. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2108 (2018) (“A putative notice to appear
that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings
is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a) [of the IIRIRA]’ . . . .”).
124. Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Id.
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contrary BIA decision,126 at least six courts of appeals, citing Chevron,
concluded that the statute was ambiguous and held the BIA interpretation to be reasonable.127 Justice Kennedy observed that “[i]n according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation, some Courts of Appeals engaged in cursory analysis of the questions whether, applying
the ordinary tools of statutory construction, Congress’s intent could
be discerned . . . and whether the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable.”128 He called this “reflexive deference”129 and citing concerns
raised by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch noted that “it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the
premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented
that decision.”130
The trepidation that Justices have expressed about deference to
agency interpretations has not been limited to cases involving Chevron deference. Auer deference, also known as Seminole Rock131 deference, is an offshoot of Chevron under which a court defers to an
agency’s interpretation of a regulation it itself has promulgated.132 In
2015, Justices Scalia, Alito, and Thomas showed a desire to reconsider
Auer deference,133 and in 2019 the Court finally took up this question.134 While the Court ultimately upheld Auer,135 it cabined the doctrine in ways that outline a possible approach the Court could take
with Chevron as well.

126. See Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (B.I.A. 2011).
127. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120 (referencing holdings from the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2121.
131. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
132. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997) (deferring to the Secretary
of Labor’s regulation).
133. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 107–12 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that even if Chevron remains, deference under Auer should be reversed); id. at 112–13 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the Seminole Rock and Auer
“line of precedents undermines our obligation to provide a judicial check on the other
branches”); id. at 107–08 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The opinions of Justice S[calia] and
Justice T[homas] offer substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”).
134. See infra Part I.E (discussing Kisor v. Wilkie).
135. See infra Part I.E.
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E. KISOR V. WILKIE AND THE SUPREME COURT’S GROWING CONCERN ABOUT
REFLEXIVE DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Not long after Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions
calling for a reconsideration of Chevron deference, the Supreme Court
decided Kisor v. Wilkie.136 While the case concerned Auer deference in
the separate but related context of judicial deference of agency interpretation of regulations, and did not concern asylum law, its deference
analysis and cross-reference to Justice Kennedy’s Pereira concurrence137 is instructive and may well foreshadow how the Supreme
Court could soon sharply recalibrate its related Chevron deference
doctrine in the context of statutory interpretation.
In Kisor, a veteran of the Vietnam War first tried to acquire disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 1982,
alleging his military service had caused him to develop post-traumatic
stress disorder.138 The VA denied his application, and in 2006 Kisor
sought to reopen his claim.139 After reopening his case, the VA agreed
Kisor was eligible for the benefits but only granted them from the date
of his motion to reopen instead of the date of his first application, as
he had requested.140 The Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the appellate
body above the VA, affirmed the retroactive decision based on its interpretation of an agency regulation governing such claims.141 The
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, an independent court that is the
first to review decisions by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, also affirmed.142 The case then made its way to the Federal Circuit which also
affirmed, but did so by applying Auer and deferring to the Board’s interpretation because it found the VA regulation relevant to the case to
be ambiguous.143 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
Kisor’s position that Auer and Seminole Rock should be overruled, ending the deference these two decisions give to agencies.144 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court did not overrule Auer and Seminole Rock.145 However, the Court conducted an in-depth analysis of Auer deference and
its justifications and, finding that the Federal Circuit had been too
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
Id. at 2415, 2446.
Id. at 2409.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2405, 2424.
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quick in assuming the doctrine applied, vacated the judgment below
and remanded the case for further proceedings.146
In its in-depth assessment of why Auer deference remains viable,
the plurality opinion authored by Justice Kagan cross-referenced Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, acknowledging that
“in a vacuum, our most classic formulation of the [Auer] test . . . may
suggest a caricature of the doctrine, in which deference is ‘reflexive.’”147 Throughout the opinion, the Court went to great lengths to explain why it thought Auer deference was still a valuable doctrine for
courts to follow and to clarify the doctrine’s boundaries.148 The Court
began by stating that “before concluding that a rule is genuinely ambiguous, a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of constructions,” citing to Chevron as “adopting the same approach for ambiguous statutes.”149 It emphasized that “only when that legal toolkit is
empty and the interpretive question still has no single right answer
can a judge conclude that it is ‘more [one] of policy than of law.’”150
The Court then explained that to demonstrate that effort, “a court
must ‘carefully consider . . .’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of
a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on,”
leaving little doubt about the depth of inquiry it expects.151
The Court then went on to explain that even if a court concludes
there is genuine ambiguity in the language, this does not mean automatic deference to an agency’s reading, noting that “[u]nder Auer, as
under Chevron, the agency’s reading must fall ‘within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation.’”152 Justice Kagan was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor as to this analysis, with Chief Justice
Roberts notably concurring in upholding Auer deference only because
of stare decisis.153
Taken together, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions and Kisor v. Wilkie provide evidence that the time may be ripe for
a new challenge to BIA interpretations of immigration law including,

146. Id. at 2423–24.
147. Id. at 2415 (citing Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
148. Id. at 2415–18.
149. Id. at 2415 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
150. Id. (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991)).
151. Id. (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 2416 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013)).
153. Id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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and perhaps especially so, in the context of the BIA’s controversial and
problematic PSG standard.154
F. THE CURRENT STATUS OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
The need for clarity in asylum law is more dire than ever because
broad policy changes undertaken by President Trump’s administration have severely curtailed asylum seekers’ access to relief.155 These
dramatic changes in asylum policy have been reflective of President
Trump’s expressed contempt for the right to apply for asylum.156 For
example, on October 8, 2017, President Trump released a list of his
“Immigration Principles and Policies,” which included “tighten[ing]
standards . . . in our asylum system.”157 The document also listed hiring more IJs and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys to accomplish the “swift return of illegal border crossers.”158 A
few days later, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions called for actions
to close “loopholes” in asylum laws, stating that “the system is being
gamed” by immigrants who only claim a fear of persecution to gain “an
easy ticket to illegal entry into the United States.”159
In March 2018, the EOIR announced a new set of performance
metrics that pressure IJs to quickly finish cases making it more challenging for them to ensure a fair process.160 The new system, which

154. See infra Part III.
155. E.g., Brian Melley & Elliot Spagat, Appeals Court: Trump Can Make Asylum Seekers Wait in Mexico, AP NEWS (May 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/6d55573fb34
44e9f8c796887a2067ebc [https://perma.cc/SPS7-5H7M].
156. John Wagner, Trump: Immigration Is “Changing the Culture” of Europe and Its
Leaders “Better Watch Themselves,” WASH. POST (July 13, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-immigration-is-changing-the-culture-of
-europe-and-its-leaders-better-watch-themselves/2018/07/13/afb5d9a6-868b
-11e8-8f6c-46cb43e3f306_story.html [https://perma.cc/R7DX-2A64] (quoting the
President in a joint news conference with British Prime Minister Theresa May, remarking “[y]ou walk across the border, you put one foot on the land, and now you’re tied up
in a lawsuit for five years. It’s the craziest thing anyone’s ever seen.”).
157. Letter from Donald J. Trump, President, to House and Senate Leaders (Oct. 8,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j
-trumps-letter-house-senate-leaders-immigration-principles-policies [https://perma
.cc/7CWD-3FQJ].
158. Id.
159. Remarks from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to the Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. (Oct.
12,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions
-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review [https://perma.cc/34PG
-Y8ZU].
160. Memorandum from James McHenry, Dir., Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., to All
EOIR Judges on Immigration Judge Performance Metrics (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www
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took effect in October 2018, “deemed [the performance of an IJ] unsatisfactory or in need of improvement if the judge completes fewer
than 700 cases per year, completes less than 95% of credible fear and
reasonable fear reviews at the first hearing, or has over 15% of cases
remanded on appeal.”161
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Sessions overturned an IJ’s
decision to grant asylum to a woman fleeing intimate partner violence
by issuing a decision in Matter of A-B-.162 In doing so, the Attorney
General “entirely ignore[d] the importance of social and cultural views
of gender and subordination as the underlying reasons for the abuse
and a country’s inability or unwillingness to provide protection.”163
This decision—which attempts to announce a policy change that
would make domestic violence- and gang violence-related claims no
longer qualify for asylum—has already received pushback from the
judiciary.164
More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to policies that
have included the suspension of asylum hearings165 and an order by
.aila.org/infonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judge-performance-metrics [https://
perma.cc/83W7-TCKR].
161. Marouf, supra note 53, at 734.
162. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317, 346 (Att’y Gen. 2018), abrogated by Grace v.
Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018).
163. Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 345–
46 (2019).
164. See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 897–900 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that the
policy change requiring asylum applicants to demonstrate their native country governments condoned persecution or were completely helpless to protect victims was
arbitrary and capricious, abrogating Matter of A-B- in part).
165. Joint DHS/EOIR Statement on MPP Rescheduling, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (June
16, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2020/06/16/joint-dhseoir-statement-mpp
-rescheduling [https://perma.cc/42TN-39AF]. In July 2020, DHS announced a plan to
restart removal hearings for noncitizens subject to the Migrant Protection Protocols
(MPP). Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice Announce Plan to
Restart MPP Hearings, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (July 17, 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2020/07/17/department-homeland-security-and-department-justice
-announce-plan-restart-mpp [https://perma.cc/BS7R-QQ77]. However, COVID-19 has
been devastating to asylum seekers forced to wait at the U.S.-Mexico border while their
cases are pending through MPP; thousands of individuals are currently living in
“cramped and unsanitary conditions” while they await an opportunity to seek refuge
in the United States. Jasmine Aguilera, Many Asylum Seekers in Mexico Can’t Get U.S.
Court Hearings Until 2021. A Coronavirus Outbreak Could ‘Devastate’ Them, TIME (May
19, 2020), https://time.com/5830807/asylum-seekers-coronavirus-mpp [https://
perma.cc/BT8J-7TCN]; see Coronavirus Case in Refugee Camp on US-Mexico Border
Raises Alarm, AL JAZEERA (June 30, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/
06/coronavirus-case-refugee-camp-mexico-border-raises-alarm-200630164210542
.html [https://perma.cc/GSM3-7JK7].
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the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that essentially
allows any individual who crossed the border into the United States
without permission to be expelled immediately, without the opportunity to apply for asylum.166 These recent developments have had an
immediate and broad-reaching impact that have throttled most of asylum adjudication for individuals at the U.S.-Mexico border167 as well
as individuals residing in the United States with cases pending in front
of USCIS or the immigration courts.168
Finally, on June 15, 2020, the Trump administration proposed a
new rule169—including a radical change to the definition of “particular
social group”—that if implemented would effectively quash the possibility of average asylum seekers getting asylum.170 “The proposed regulation provides a ‘nonexhaustive’ list of nine ‘circumstances’ that . . .
would be considered ‘generally insufficient to demonstrate’” a basis
for asylum, eliminating multiple PSGs that were previously recognized
and protected.171 As this Note goes to press, major questions remain
regarding whether the Trump administration can and will pass the
166. Notice of Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act
Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries Where a Communicable
Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060, 17,060–88 (Mar. 26, 2020).
167. See supra note 165; Joel Rose, Ending ‘Asylum as We Know It’: Using Pandemic
to Expel Migrants, Children at Border, NPR (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/
08/06/898937378/end-of-asylum-using-the-pandemic-to-turn-away-migrants
-children-seeking-refuge [https://perma.cc/CAV2-4S9X].
168. See Jennie Kneedler, Impact of COVID-19 on the Immigration System, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration/immigration
-updates/impact-of-covid-19-on-the-immigration-system [https://perma.cc/AC5G
-X6QG].
169. See generally Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible
Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,264–306 (June 15, 2020)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235) (outlining the Trump administration’s amendment to “the regulations governing credible fear determinations”).
170. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Asylum Officers Condemn What They Call ‘Draconian’
Plans by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/
us/politics/asylum-officers-trump.html [https://perma.cc/E87V-BG5F] (quoting a
spokesman representing employees of USCIS); Priscilla Alvarez & Geneva Sands,
Trump Administration Proposes Sweeping Changes to US Asylum System in New Rule,
CNN (June 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/10/politics/us-asylum-draft
-rule/index.html [https://perma.cc/WNP6-RUPN] (quoting Aaron Reichlin-Melnick,
policy counsel at the American Immigration Council, as criticizing the proposal as an
attempt “to make asylum impossible to win”).
171. Bill Frelick, Comment on Proposed Changes to Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 15, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/15/comment-proposed-changes
-procedures-asylum-and-withholding-removal-credible-fear [https://perma.cc/N62Z
-2RVJ].
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regulation before the November 2020 election. The uncertainty about
whether the new rule will be passed and the very high likelihood that
it will encounter major pushback even if it is passed172 shows that the
need to clarify the PSG definition remains relevant and urgent.
II. CHANGE TO AND CONFUSION REGARDING THE STANDARD FOR
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUPS
The BIA’s interpretation of the PSG definition in Matter of Acosta
became the uniformly accepted standard across circuit courts and a
model within asylum law around the world.173 Remaining unchanged
for close to twenty years, the ubiquitous acceptance of the Acosta definition facilitated increased clarity and consistency in asylum case adjudications until the BIA added additional requirements of particularity and social visibility in a series of decisions between 2006 and
2008.174 These changes to the PSG standard led to an initial circuit
court split, as some courts deferred to the BIA citing Chevron deference,175 while others rejected the additions.176 After several years of
confusion regarding the application of particularity and social visibility to the PSG definition, the BIA purported to clarify the definition
through a pair of cases in 2014 that maintained the particularity requirement and replaced “social visibility” with “social distinction.”177
These new changes to the PSG definition did not end the circuit split;
circuits that deferred to the first changes now disagree on how to treat
the 2014 definition,178 while one of the circuits that declined to adopt
the first additions has also refused to adopt the 2014 definition.179
This Part analyzes the reasoning courts have used in their decisions to
defer or not defer to the BIA’s additional requirements and concludes
that circuit courts that have deferred appear to have done so without
fully “exhaust[ing] all the ‘traditional tools’ of [statutory]

172. See, e.g., Tess Feldman, Administration’s Asylum Proposal Takes Aim at LGBTQ
Survivors, HILL (Aug. 11, 2020, 8:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/
511604-administrations-asylum-proposal-takes-aim-at-lgbtq-survivors [https://
perma.cc/USD6-S3S8] (arguing that the proposed regulation has already been heavily
criticized as unconstitutionally curtailing due process rights and violating the intention of the Refugee Act of 1980).
173. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
174. See infra Part II.A.
175. See infra Part II.B.1.
176. See infra Part II.B.2.
177. See infra Part II.C.
178. See infra Part II.D.
179. See infra Part II.D.
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construction” as required by the Supreme Court in Kisor v. Wilkie for
Auer deference.180
A. FIRST ROUND OF CHANGE: THE BIA ADDS PARTICULARITY AND SOCIAL
VISIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
Through several decisions issued between 2006 and 2008, the
BIA changed the definition of “particular social group” by adding two
additional requirements. The first signal of change came in Matter of
C-A-, a 2006 decision in which the BIA stated that social visibility was
an important consideration in identifying the existence of a PSG.181
The Board rejected the proposed PSG of “noncriminal drug informants
working against the Cali drug cartel.”182 The case involved an individual who had acquired information about the Cali drug cartel in Colombia from the head of security for the cartel and then passed along what
he learned to another friend working within the government.183 The
cartel learned of what the respondent had done and retaliated by trying to kidnap him and beating his son so brutally that he needed reconstructive surgery.184 The only issue before the Board was whether
the respondent’s proposed group was a PSG,185 which it declined to
find because “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it is
generally out of the public view.”186
In 2007, the BIA published Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, which included “social visibility” and “particularity” in its PSG analysis but did
not provide details as to how these factors related to the Acosta definition.187 Citing to Matter of C-A-, the Board generally seemed to treat
these as additional factors for a judge to consider after applying the
immutable characteristics test; however, in some parts of the opinion
the Board seemed to point to the new elements as independent tests
for determining a PSG.188 The case ultimately held that “wealthy Guatemalans” are not a PSG because the terms “wealthy” and “affluent”
180. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
181. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
182. Id. at 957–58.
183. Id. at 952.
184. Id. at 952–53.
185. Id. at 954.
186. Id. at 960.
187. A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007) (noting with approval that
the immigration judge had correctly applied Acosta with a Second Circuit decision
without further explanation).
188. See id. at 74 (framing C-A- as a recent affirmation of “the importance of social
visibility as a factor” in determining a PSG, but only a few paragraphs later describing
how “requisite” social visibility is to be determined).
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standing alone are too “amorphous” to meet the particularity requirement.189
These early indications of changes to the BIA’s approach to analyzing PSGs crystalized in 2008 in two landmark precedential decisions, Matter of S-E-G-190 and Matter of E-A-G-.191 In S-E-G-, the Board
rejected the proposed PSGs “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral,
and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities”192 and
“the family members of such Salvadoran youth.”193 The case involved
two young brothers who refused recruitment efforts by the dangerous
MS-13 gang; the gang retaliated by physically assaulting the brothers
and threatening to kill them as well as rape and harm their older sister.194 In its denial, the BIA outlined what members of a proposed PSG
would need to show to prove their group had social visibility. “[C]onsidered in the context of the country of concern and the persecution
feared,” members must share some “discrete” characteristic that sets
them apart and indicates they are “‘perceive[d] as a group’ by society.”195 The Board concluded that there was insufficient evidence
showing that those who refuse gang recruitment are socially distinct.196
The Board also defined the particularity requirement, explaining
that “[t]he essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement . . . is whether the
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question,
as a discrete class of persons.”197 This means a group must have “particular and well-defined boundaries”198 and be able to be articulated
using terms that are an adequate “benchmark for determining group
membership.”199 While the brothers had tried to further narrow their
189. Id. at 76.
190. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
191. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 595 (B.I.A. 2008).
192. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. at 581.
193. Id. at 588.
194. Id. at 580.
195. Id. at 586–87.
196. Id. at 587 (“[Individuals who refuse gang recruitment are] not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang, or who is perceived to
be a threat to the gang’s interests.”).
197. Id. at 584 (citing Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir.
2008)).
198. Id. at 582.
199. Id. at 584.
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PSG based on their gender, lower socioeconomic status, and residence
in a gang-controlled area, the BIA found these to be both too amorphous as well as unlikely reasons a gang would use in identifying who
to recruit.200 The BIA found the sister’s PSG to be too ill-defined because “family members” was not sufficiently narrow and could encompass extended family relatives.201
The BIA took a parallel approach in Matter of E-A-G-, holding that
Honduran youth who rejected gang recruitment efforts did not constitute a PSG.202 The proposed group failed the social visibility requirement because the Board concluded there was no distinguishing characteristic that would allow others in Honduras to identify the
petitioners as such.203 Together, these cases essentially found that resistance to gang membership would not satisfy the newly added requirement of particularity and social visibility for individuals seeking
asylum based on membership in a PSG.204
B. UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION: CIRCUIT COURTS SPLIT ON NEW
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP REQUIREMENTS
The BIA’s decisions in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- were
met with varying responses from the circuit courts in ensuing litigation. Some circuits applied Chevron deference and accepted both new
additions to the PSG standard.205 Most at least deferred to the BIA’s
addition of the social visibility requirement.206 However two circuits,
the Third and the Seventh, expressly rejected the social visibility requirement as problematic and inconsistent with the BIA’s prior case
law.207
1. Circuits Deferring to the New Additions Under Chevron
Even before the BIA made social visibility and particularity official requirements to the PSG standard, the Eleventh and Second Circuits deferred to the addition of these factors.208 However, neither circuit court’s opinion demonstrated a particularly searching analysis of
the applicability of Chevron. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the direct
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 585–86.
Id.
E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 595 (B.I.A. 2008).
Id. at 595–60.
See id. at 594.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
Casper et al., supra note 44, at 10.
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appeal of Matter of C-A- and provided a fairly cursory reference to
Chevron, framing the BIA’s action as simply a “further articulation of
the Acosta formulation” without explaining precisely why this was
so.209 Similarly, in its review of the direct appeal of Matter of A-M-E- &
J-G-U-,210 the Second Circuit deferred to social visibility and particularity after citing Chevron without further elaboration of precisely
how the statutory phrase “particular social group” is ambiguous.211
Four circuits—the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Sixth—deferred completely to the requirements of social visibility and particularity, all in
cases involving individuals resisting gangs similar to the applicant in
S-E-G-.212 The Fourth Circuit deferred only to the particularity requirement but declined to defer to social visibility.213 Meanwhile, the Ninth
Circuit initially deferred to both social visibility and particularity in
multiple published opinions214 but later took up the issue again and
explained its views on the requirements in more detail.215
In Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, the First Circuit considered the proposed group of “young [Salvadoran] women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” and accepted the new requirements
as “an elaboration of how [the immutable characteristic requirement]
operates.”216 The court did not engage in a thorough examination of
the meaning of “particular social group,” noting that the term is ambiguous because it “is not defined by statute” and quickly pointing out
that it had previously upheld the BIA’s description of the term under
Acosta.217
In Orellana-Monson v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit also determined
that the BIA’s incorporation of particularity and social visibility was a
permissible construction “of a statute that is decidedly vague and

209. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006); see also
Jimenez-Perez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 817 F. App’x 676, 682 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing CastilloArias without further explaining why the BIA’s interpretation of PSGs is owed deference).
210. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
211. Id. at 72.
212. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 11–12.
213. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 910 (4th Cir. 2014), as revised, (Jan. 27,
2014); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165 n.4 (4th Cir. 2012).
214. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009); Ramos-Lopez v.
Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2009).
215. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(holding that the social visibility requirement does not require “on-sight” visibility).
216. Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2010).
217. Id. at 25.
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ambiguous.”218 The court determined that the first step of Chevron had
been fulfilled because “‘particular social group’ is not defined by the
INA” but “does however occur in the statute defining the term ‘refugee’, which the BIA administers.”219 The court went on to find that the
BIA had met Step Two of Chevron because the additional tests were
“not a radical departure from prior interpretation, but rather a subtle
shift that evolved out of the BIA’s prior decisions on similar cases and
is a reasoned interpretation, which is therefore entitled to deference.”220 The court held that the proposed PSG of “men who refused
to join the Mara 18 gang” was not particular enough because it encompassed a “wide swath of society,” and also failed the social visibility
requirement because members of society, including the Mara 18,
would not view “non-recruits” as a group but rather only as individuals who go “against the gang’s interest.”221
The Tenth Circuit rejected a proposed particular social group of
“women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted
gang recruitment” and deferred to both additional requirements.222
The Tenth Circuit’s application of Chevron was even more cursory
than the Fifth Circuit’s, noting simply that “Congress did not define the
term ‘particular social group’ in the INA, so we defer to the BIA’s interpretation unless it is unreasonable.”223 The court affirmed the BIA,
stating that “the particularity requirement flows quite naturally from
the language of the statute . . . . It is the BIA’s responsibility to give
meaning to all of the language of the statute, especially when there is
some ambiguity as to its scope and application.”224 The Tenth Circuit
also reasoned that as long as the social visibility requirement was not
read too narrowly, the BIA’s addition of this test was neither “inconsistent” nor “illogical” with the definition set out in Acosta.225
The Sixth Circuit upheld social visibility and particularity requirements for PSG claims in Umana-Ramos v. Holder and rejected a
claim by “young Salvadoran males who refused recruitment by ‘Maras’
[or gangs].”226 Interestingly, the court did not cite Chevron at all. Instead, it cited a previous Sixth Circuit case for its standard of review
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 652.
Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 670 (6th Cir. 2013).
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of “substantial deference . . . to the BIA’s interpretation of the INA and
accompanying regulations.”227 In its implicit application of Chevron,
the court stated that “[t]he BIA’s definition of ‘particular social group’
warrants deference” but did not further elaborate on why this was its
determination.228
The Fourth Circuit deferred to the BIA’s addition of particularity
citing Chevron, after determining that “particular social group” is ambiguous because “neither the relevant statute nor its associated regulations specifically define the term.”229 However, it did not further analyze the BIA’s decision and summarily stated that it would defer to
the Board’s “reasonable interpretation of the term.”230 The court declined to decide whether or not to defer to the requirement of social
visibility, citing criticism of the addition by the Seventh Circuit.231
The Ninth Circuit in Ramos-Lopez v. Holder held that the new definition required Chevron deference and was reasonable because the
BIA had implicit authority from Congress to resolve any ambiguity
since the INA did not define “particular social group.”232 The court affirmed the BIA’s decision to reject “young Honduran men who have
been recruited by MS-13, but who refuse to join” as a PSG, holding it
was reasonable for the BIA not to find this to be a group because gangs
target all young men in Honduras, making the proposed PSG insufficiently particular.233 The proposed group lacked social visibility because only the gang, not the society at large, would recognize individuals who resisted recruitment and then only because the gang would
keep tabs on them.234 A few years later in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder,
the Ninth Circuit clarified that it did not define social visibility as “onsight visibility” and therefore did not find the new requirement inconsistent with BIA precedent.235
As these opinions demonstrate, circuit courts that deferred to the
BIA’s additional requirements after the first round of changes to the
227. Id. (quoting Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)).
228. Id. at 671 (citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003)).
229. Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446 (4th Cir. 2011).
230. Id. (citing Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 654 (4th Cir. 2009)).
231. Id. at 447 n.4 (“Because social visibility is not essential to the result we reach
here, we need not separately evaluate that criterion.”).
232. Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 858–62 (9th Cir. 2009).
233. Id. at 861–62.
234. Id. at 862.
235. Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1088–91 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(“We agree that a requirement of ‘on-sight’ visibility would be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions and likely impermissible under the statute. However, we do not
read C-A- and subsequent cases to require ‘on-sight’ visibility.”).
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PSG definition did so without rigorously examining the ambiguity of
the term “particular social group.” This easy deference reflects how,
despite the fact that U.S. asylum law is foundationally tethered to international law, courts have been “surprisingly willing to discount international law governing domestic asylum statutes by deferring to
expansive executive agency statutory interpretations that do not conform—and in many cases, have made no effort to conform—to limitations created by U.S. international treaty obligations.”236 The frequency with which Chevron deference was afforded is even more
concerning considering how “the BIA rarely adequately explains its
variance in decision making.”237
2. Circuits Rejecting the Social Visibility Test
Not all of the circuits deferred to the BIA’s additions, however.
The Seventh Circuit created a circuit split by repudiating S-E-G- and its
predecessors in Gatimi v. Holder,238 and the Third Circuit later followed suit in the second round of litigation in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Attorney General of U.S.239 The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the
addition of the social visibility requirement, finding “the government’s
position that an individual’s success in hiding a characteristic defeats
her claim of membership in a particular social group defined by that
characteristic” to be problematic.240 The court determined that accepting the social visibility requirement would “condone arbitrariness,” reasoning that rejecting PSGs based on invisible characteristics
would be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions.241 The court gave
three examples of prior groups the BIA had recognized as PSGs that
do not have a socially visible characteristic: women within tribes who
are at risk of female genital mutilation, homosexuals living in homophobic societies, and former members of the military police.242 The
236. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist
Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1062–63 (2011).
237. Claudia B. Quintero, Ganging Up on Immigration Law: Asylum Law and the Particular Social Group Standard––Former Gang Members and Their Need for Asylum Protections, 13 U. MASS. L. REV. 192, 215 (2018).
238. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
239. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez I), 502 F.3d
285, 290 (3d Cir. 2007); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez
II), 663 F.3d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 2011).
240. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 13 (citing Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616).
241. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616.
242. Id. at 615–16 (referring to Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996);
Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990); and Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec.
658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988), respectively).
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Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the BIA had never mentioned
social visibility in those prior cases, and because it had added social
visibility as a requirement without explaining how it was consistent
with them, the new definition was inconsistent with the Acosta definition.243
The Third Circuit also concluded that the BIA’s addition of the
particularity and social visibility requirements were not entitled to
Chevron deference.244 Using similar reasoning to the Seventh Circuit,
the court noted that the social visibility test was inconsistent with the
BIA’s prior cases.245 The court asserted that the BIA’s articulation of
social visibility in Matter of C-A- limiting PSGs to those defined by
“characteristics that were highly visible and recognizable by others in
the country in question” was inconsistent with Kasinga, Toboso-Alfonso, and Fuentes.246 Citing Gatimi, the Third Circuit also found that
requiring social visibility did not make sense because asylum claims
are commonly based on membership in groups characterized by identities that are not externally visible and that its members may go to
lengths to keep hidden.247 The court remanded to the BIA, stating that
the addition of the two requirements was “inconsistent with its prior
decisions, and the BIA has not announced a principled reason for its
adoption of those inconsistent requirements.”248
In 2013, right before the second round of changes by the BIA regarding its addition of social visibility and particularity as requirements, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision with its most thorough
opinion analyzing the PSG standard.249 In Cece v. Holder, the court en
banc recognized the petitioner’s claim based on membership in the
PSG “young Albanian women who live alone”250 and in doing so “addressed the floodgates concern that seem[ed] to animate the Board’s
additional restrictions.”251 In analyzing the application of Chevron, the
court explained that “[w]hether a group constitutes a particular social
group under the Immigration and Nationality Act is a question of law
that we review de novo, while giving Chevron deference to the Board’s
reasonable interpretation set forth in precedential opinions
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 616.
Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, 663 F.3d at 604.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605 (citing Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615).
Id. at 608 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
Id.
Casper et al., supra note 44, at 15.
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interpreting the statute.”252 Finding that Congress had not spoken directly to the definition of “particular social group,” the court went on
to discuss its deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the term in
Acosta.253 The Seventh Circuit noted that its duty was “to uphold the
Board’s determination if it [wa]s supported by substantial evidence—
that is, reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.”254 The court explained that just because individuals share a heightened risk or experience of persecution does not
mean they lack other shared protected characteristics, and a group
can be defined in part by persecution as long as it is not the only characteristic that defines the group.255 The court went on to discuss how
membership in a PSG is only the first step toward an asylum seeker
being granted relief, and that the nexus requirement is “where the
rubber meets the road.”256 Therefore, the potential breadth of a PSG
does not have a significant bearing on the number of people who actually qualify for asylum since an individual must demonstrate a fear
of persecution on account of her protected characteristic.257 Dispensing forcefully with the idea that overbreadth is a concern in granting
asylum, the court emphasized that “[i]t would be antithetical to asylum law to deny refuge to a group of persecuted individuals who have
valid claims merely because too many have valid claims.”258
C. 2014: THE BIA ENTRENCHES CHANGES TO THE ACOSTA DEFINITION IN
MATTER OF W-G-R- AND MATTER OF M-E-V-GOn remand, Valdiviezo-Galdamez II was renamed Matter of M-EV-G-,259 and the BIA accepted supplemental briefs from both parties.
The UNHCR submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the petitioner arguing that the additions of particularity and social visibility put the
United States at odds with the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol by

252. Cece, 733 F.3d at 668.
253. Id. at 668–69.
254. Id. at 669 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 671.
256. Id. at 673; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing the nexus
requirement).
257. Cece, 733 F.3d at 673–74 (discussing how the court analogized this aspect of
asylum to Title VII and that under Title VII, the number of people that hypothetically
qualify within the protected groups of women or African Americans is very large, but
those that have legitimate claims of discrimination is not).
258. Id. at 675.
259. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014); see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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limiting availability of international protection.260 This supported the
petitioner’s argument that, to the extent the additional requirements
were to exclude particular groups because of their size, it is inconsistent with international refugee agreements.261 On the other side,
the government argued for a new test of “social distinction” saying it
was a necessary clarification to Acosta.262 Specifically, it argued that to
be recognized as a particular social group, a proposed PSG must
demonstrate that “(1) the group is composed of members who share
a common, immutable characteristic; (2) the group must be perceived
by the society in question as distinct; and (3) the social group must
exist independently of the fact of persecution.”263 The government
cited to FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.264 as allowing the BIA to depart from its own precedent and argued that it had satisfied the minimum requirement of “demonstrating awareness” of the new elements
added to the Acosta standard.265
On February 7, 2014, the BIA issued its decision.266 While it conceded some overlap between requirements for particularity and social visibility, rather than removing either requirement the BIA doubled down.267 The BIA maintained that the additional requirements
did not change the Acosta immutability requirement but were simply
a clarification to increase uniformity.268 The Board also renamed “social visibility” as “social distinction” following the test proposed by
DHS.269 In defining “social distinction,” the Board clarified that there
is no requirement of “on-sight” or “ocular” visibility; rather, it requires
proposed PSGs be “perceived as a group by society.”270 The BIA’s consideration of the international standards the U.S. asylum definition is
based on was bare; it stated that the international standards did not
control and that its own interpretation “more accurately captures the
260. Brief for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6–7, Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A.
2014) (No. A097-447-286).
261. Id.
262. Brief of DHS on Remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (No. A097-447-286) [hereinafter Brief of
DHS].
263. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
264. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
265. Brief of DHS, supra note 262, at 12 n.14.
266. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
267. Id. at 239–41.
268. Id. at 234.
269. Id. at 236, 238. The BIA did note, however, that its conception of “social distinction” was not exactly the same as the one DHS proposed in its brief. Id. at 236 n.11.
270. Id. at 240.
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concepts underlying the United States’ obligations under the Protocol,” again invoking Chevron deference.271
The same day, the BIA issued a companion case to M-E-V-G- which
rejected a claim based on membership in the PSG “former members of
the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership.”272 Matter of W-G-R- used very similar language to M-E-V-Gand concluded the proposed group was too “diffuse, . . . broad[,] and
subjective.”273
D. PRIMARY CRITICISMS OF THE BIA’S DECISIONS IN M-E-V-G- AND W-G-RThe critiques of the BIA’s 2014 decisions cementing social distinction and particularity as additional requirements center around
three main concerns.274 First, the new test is inconsistent with the
statute and disparately restricts access to refugee protections for applicants with PSG claims compared to those with claims based on
other protected grounds.275 Second, it contradicts earlier decisions
under the Acosta standard without adequately distinguishing or explaining the tensions with the analysis in those cases.276 And third, the
new requirements erect significant new barriers to equity for applicants and create administrability challenges for the immigration
courts.277
In particular, the new requirements have the effect of preventing
recognition of PSGs that may encompass large numbers of people.278
They also create major practical challenges for asylum seekers, especially those who are pro se.279 Pro se applicants must now, on their
own,
articulate a group that conforms to the competing social distinction and particularity standards and [] meet the substantial evidentiary burden imposed.
An applicant must ensure that her particular social group is well-defined by
characteristics that are precise, have a common definition, and are not amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, vague, or subjective. Additionally, the group must
be perceived as one by society, and not just by the applicant’s persecutors.

271. Id. at 247–49.
272. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 2014).
273. Id. at 221.
274. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 17–18.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See generally Bednar, supra note 22 (analyzing the restrictively high standards of particularity and social distinction on pro se applicants).
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To do this, the Board suggest[ed] providing expert testimony, country condition reports, and press accounts.280

These additions to the PSG standard impermissibly narrowed the
PSG definition, making it much more difficult for asylum seekers with
PSG claims to succeed and bringing U.S. asylum adjudication further
away from congressional intent and internationally recognized norms
for protecting individuals fleeing persecution.
E. CIRCUIT COURTS’ ANALYSES POST-M-E-V-G- AND W-G-RAfter M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, circuit courts that had previously accepted the three-part PSG definition have so far adopted the new version.281 However, while the Seventh Circuit has continued to reject any
post-Acosta additions to the PSG requirements,282 the Third Circuit accepted the BIA’s revised definition in S.E.R.L. v. Attorney General.283
1. Quick to Say Yes: The Eleventh Circuit Example of Cursory
Deference
The Eleventh Circuit’s 2016 decision in Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney
General284 provides an example of the sort of analysis circuits have
used to justify deference to the BIA post-M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-. The
opinion began by noting that while the Eleventh Circuit’s standard is
to apply de novo review to BIA decisions, precedential decisions by
the Board are entitled to Chevron deference.285 It observed that its
own precedent held that the term “particular social group” is ambiguous in the INA and that therefore the BIA’s interpretations merited
Chevron deference.286 The court briefly mentioned the Acosta definition before turning to the new requirements. First, the court observed
that “[i]n subsequent decisions [to Acosta], the BIA has elaborated that
a particular social group must also be ‘defined with particularity’ and
280. Casper et al., supra note 44, at 19–20 (footnotes omitted).
281. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We now hold
that the BIA’s interpretation in W-G-R- and M-E-V-G- of the ambiguous phrase ‘particular social group,’ including the BIA’s articulation of the ‘particularity’ and ‘social distinction’ requirements is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference.”); Reyna v.
Lynch, 631 F. App’x 366, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2015); Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th
Cir. 2015) (citing M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)); Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 404–05 (11th Cir. 2016).
282. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016); R.R.D. v. Holder, 746
F.3d 807, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2014).
283. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018).
284. Gonzalez, 820 F.3d at 399.
285. Id. at 403–04.
286. Id. at 404.

2021]

BEYOND CHEVRON DEFERENCE

1577

‘socially distinct within the society in question’” and cited M-E-V-G-.287
Next, the court cited W-G-R- as representing how, “[r]egarding the
particularly requirement, the BIA has stated that ‘[t]he [proposed]
group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must
not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.’”288 Yet without
further explanation of its thoughts on either of these new standards,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded—at least in regards to particularity—
that the BIA’s decision deserved Chevron deference.289 Other circuits
that have deferred to the 2014 BIA decisions cementing the additional
PSG requirements have similarly engaged in rather cursory Chevron
analysis.
The BIA’s additions to the PSG standard have therefore put asylum seekers in an even more vulnerable position than they were in
prior to 2007 and caused a circuit split leading to nationwide confusion and inconsistency in asylum adjudication. Critically, the circuits
that have deferred to these new additions—with the notable exception of the Seventh Circuit—have done so without rigorous analysis as
to whether Chevron deference to the BIA’s new requirements is appropriate. With key signals from the Supreme Court that it will no longer
entertain this kind of reflexive deference, it is now time for the judiciary to reject the particularity and social distinction requirements and
extend asylum to those entitled to protection from their persecutors
under U.S. and international law.
III. MOVING BEYOND “REFLEXIVE” DEFERENCE: A POTENTIAL
AVENUE FOR RE-LITIGATING THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
STANDARD
Since 2007, the BIA’s additional requirements for the PSG definition have created legal and practical challenges for asylum seekers,
advocates, and adjudicators. However, the reasoning in recent Supreme Court opinions suggests that, if the Court were to take up a case
concerning the circuit courts’ deference to the BIA on these additions,
the Court would be likely to follow the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
and decline to adopt the particularity and social visibility
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 405 (“Because the BIA decision relied on . . . Matter of W-G-R- . . . [a] precedential decision[] issued by a three-member panel of the BIA, the BIA’s determination . . . is entitled to Chevron deference. We do not think either conclusion, either of
which is sufficient to deny the relief sought by Gonzalez, is an unreasonable interpretation of ‘particular social group’ as used in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).”). Similarly, the
contrast between the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II and the
court’s decision in S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. is stark in its minimal analysis.
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requirements. This Note argues that, taken together, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions and the restriction of Auer
deference in Kisor v. Wilkie suggest that the time is ripe for an appropriate case to litigate the issue. At the very least, these developments
in Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest that circuit courts that have
deferred to the new PSG requirements should reconsider whether
Chevron deference was proper. If they do so, circuit courts should find
that the requirements of particularity and especially social distinction
are an arbitrary departure from the Acosta standard and an unreasonable interpretation of the INA.
A. THE TIME IS RIPE FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO INTERVENE AND RESOLVE
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP STANDARD
The recent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest that it is now even more urgent and appropriate for the Court to
resolve the circuit split and ensuing confusion surrounding the particular social group standard. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira
v. Sessions calling for a reexamination of “reflexive” Chevron deference,
cross-referencing opinions of other Justices who have also called the
Chevron doctrine into question, has gained heightened meaning with
the Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.290 Together with the Court’s recent cabining of Auer deference, these recent actions suggest that the
Supreme Court is moving towards higher scrutiny of administrative
deference. While Auer deference is distinct from Chevron in important
ways, the reasoning in Kisor provides a helpful template for what the
Court’s approach might be in the statutory context. At the very least,
the reasoning in Kisor suggests that the Supreme Court now expects
that when courts review whether or not to give agency decisions deference, it will expect a robust analysis at Step One of Chevron.
This background provides a compelling way forward for advocates in the asylum context and especially regarding PSG analysis.
Chevron Step One does not ask simply whether the statute is ambiguous but rather focuses on whether or not Congress has spoken to the
particular issue at hand.291 Moving forward, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions and Kisor v. Wilkie suggest that a court
tasked with determining whether or not a proposed PSG is valid must
first identify what the precise question at issue is. Then, it must exhaust all tools of statutory construction to determine whether or not
“particular social group” is truly ambiguous within the INA. Finally,
290. See supra Part I.E.
291. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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even if the phrase is ambiguous, the court will need to determine
whether, considering the BIA has continued to identify Acosta as the
term’s baseline definition, the additional requirements are truly reasonable and merit Chevron deference.
B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
PERSUASIVE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP ANALYSIS BECAUSE IT EMPLOYS
RIGOROUS KISOR-ESQUE ANALYSIS
As discussed previously, most circuits have deferred to either the
BIA’s first or second round of additions to the Acosta definition.292
However, there is good reason to believe that if the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to a case challenging these additions, it would be
inclined to adopt reasoning similar to the Seventh Circuit’s. While a
review of the deferring circuit court opinions demonstrates characteristics that Justice Kennedy’s Pereira concurrence was expressly wary
of, the Seventh Circuit in Cece v. Holder looks most like the rigorous
analysis the Supreme Court is now likely to require after Kisor v.
Wilkie.293 In Cece v. Holder, the court did not assume that the term
“particular social group” is ambiguous but rather undertook its own
analysis of the term before concluding that Congress had not defined
it.294 It then reasoned that the BIA’s interpretation of the term in
Acosta was reasonable and therefore meritorious of Chevron deference.295 However, in stark contrast to its sister circuits that deferred,
the Seventh Circuit in analyzing the additions of particularity and social visibility closely examined whether or not they made sense within
the BIA’s own definition and the larger purpose of the INA.296 With ME-V-G- and W-G-R- cementing these requirements into the BIA’s understanding of the PSG definition for the foreseeable future, the Supreme Court adopting Kisor-type scrutiny should find that “the BIA is
not providing a reasoned explanation, nor is it adequately explaining
its decision, rather it is ‘rewriting prior decisions so they appear to
conform to the new requirements.’”297
One pertinent counterargument to this proposal is that Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence pointedly states that Kisor does not change

292. See supra Part II.
293. See supra Parts I.E, II.B.2.
294. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 672–74.
297. Quintero, supra note 237 (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Reyes v.
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-241)).
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the Court’s interpretation of Chevron deference.298 According to the
Chief Justice, Auer raises different issues than Chevron.299 On its face,
this may seem to undercut the argument that the reasoning in Kisor
could be applied more broadly. However, closer examination reveals
that the essential root of the plurality’s analysis in Kisor combined
with the Supreme Court’s trend toward limiting reflexive Chevron deference suggests that the dicta in Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence
does not have any real teeth. Justice Kagan went to great lengths to
examine the conditions under which Auer deference is proper as a way
to demonstrate the plurality’s position that the doctrine has not always been applied with sufficient rigor, and perhaps even too reflexively.300 Additionally, the Court’s chidings about how and when Auer
should be applied could easily be said about Chevron deference.301
Most importantly, “[i]t seems unlikely that a genuine ambiguity is ascertainable under Chevron more readily than a genuine ambiguity under Auer.” As Professor Matthew Melone aptly asks, “Why should a
court ignore its full interpretative toolkit in . . . [Chevron] but not . . .
[Auer]?”302 While Chief Justice Roberts may have been attempting to
stem any immediate post-Kisor flow of challenges to Chevron, neither
his concurrence nor the plurality opinion expresses any convincing
reasoning that agency interpretations of statutes should be examined
any less rigorously than agency interpretations of their own regulations. Therefore, it would be completely appropriate for the Supreme
Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the particular social group
standard by adopting the reasoning in Cece v. Holder, which determined after a searching statutory analysis of the INA and the BIA’s
prior case law that the post-Acosta additions to the PSG definition did
not merit Chevron deference.
C. EVEN IF THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT INTERVENE, LOWER COURTS
SHOULD OVERTURN PRIOR RULINGS THAT REFLEXIVELY DEFERRED TO THE
NEW REQUIREMENTS
If the Supreme Court does not take up resolving the circuit split
regarding the PSG standard, lower courts should reconsider their
prior decisions. Immigration advocates can develop new arguments
based on the reasoning in Kisor v. Wilkie to demand the circuit courts
298. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 2414–15.
301. Matthew A. Melone, Kisor v. Wilkie: Auer Deference Is Alive but Not So Well. Is
Chevron Next?, 12 NE. U. L. REV. 581, 627 (2020).
302. Id.
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undertake a more searching analysis of the statutory text prior to concluding the BIA deserves Chevron deference. For example, advocates
in the Eleventh Circuit might now challenge Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney
General303 or other opinions citing to its holding on the basis that it
was too quick to assume ambiguity as to the specific question being
reviewed and thereby push the courts to provide further analysis and
explanation if they accept or reject the new standard. Fresh challenges
to the recent changes to the PSG standard, all too easily adopted by the
circuit courts throughout the past decade, could eventually lead to
much needed clarification and standardization making asylum adjudication more equitable and accessible across the circuits.
D. A RETURN TO ACOSTA?
Courts engaging in more directed determinations of the meaning
of “particular social group” will be able to move away from operating
“under the mistaken perception that they are bound . . . to defer to the
BIA’s construction of U.S. refugee statutes, regardless of whether that
construction is consistent with international law.”304 This is precisely
the kind of reflexive deference that goes against Congress’s purpose
in its passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which stated its desire to
bring domestic asylum law into conformance with international obligations clearly and unambiguously.305 Applying the more rigorous
analysis of Kisor v. Wilkie to the context of Chevron deference, the Supreme Court or circuit courts could hypothetically determine that the
term is not ambiguous at all. However, considering the role and establishment of the Acosta definition—and the lack of a circuit split as to
its reasonableness—this version of the PSG definition would likely
pass muster.
A challenge to the new PSG standard could be framed as examining the precise question of whether the Acosta immutability definition
and the purpose of the INA require an applicant to provide evidence
that their PSG is recognized in articulable terms in their home society
in order to be considered for protection from persecution. This narrow
question contesting the addition of the social distinction requirement
could allow litigation that would get at the root of concerns expressed
by advocates that “[r]ather than clarifying the particular social group
standard, the BIA’s decision in M-E-V-G- creates a game of semantics
303. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016).
304. Farbenblum, supra note 236, at 1064.
305. Id. at 1069 (noting that “the Refugee Act is one of a small number of ‘incorporative statutes’ that directly incorporate international treaty language and concepts
into U.S. domestic law”).
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that requires an applicant to navigate the fine line between social distinction and particularity.”306 This does not mean that the BIA might
not further elaborate a standard beyond or different from Acosta in
the future that might survive more rigorous Chevron review. However,
should the Supreme Court take up this circuit split and subject the PSG
standard to a properly (re)calibrated Chevron analysis, it is possible
and even likely that it would find the current inclusion of particularity
and social distinction do not pass muster.
CONCLUSION
The BIA’s additions to the particular social group standard between 2007 and 2014 created inconsistency and confusion in the adjudication of asylum claims. This has erected additional barriers for
asylum seekers, especially those that are pro se, making it more likely
for a court to reject their asylum applications before considering the
substance of their claims. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v.
Wilkie, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, and the
calls by various Justices to reexamine the deference afforded to administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine suggest a new way
forward for settling this important circuit split in asylum law. The Supreme Court should take up this issue and, in light of its recent jurisprudence, follow the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit declining to defer to the BIA’s addition of social distinction and particularity to the
PSG definition. If the Supreme Court continues to decline opportunities to resolve the circuit split surrounding the PSG standard, circuit
courts should reexamine their decisions to determine whether they
deferred too reflexively to the BIA’s additions. Until the uncertainty
and inconsistency of the PSG standard is resolved, asylum seekers
with valid claims will continue to face the possibility that they will not
be granted protection from persecution.

306. Bednar, supra note 22, at 357.

